Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts

by Ben Atherton Updated Fri 9 Mar 2012

Photo: Father and son: Bashar al-Assad and Hafez al-Assad (Reuters)

Map: Syrian Arab Republic

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has been accused of waging a brutal war against his own people as he fights rebels who want an end to his family's 40-year rule.

In doing so he is following in the footsteps of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who presided over the deaths of thousands of people when he unleashed his forces to crush an Islamist uprising in the early 1980s.

Bashar al-Assad had been showing signs of loosening his grip on the country until protests broke out last year.

"I admit to total incomprehension as to how this man has changed," French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who hosted Mr Assad in Paris in 2008, said recently.

"He was not a democrat, but two years ago he was not massacring women and children in Homs. He was not a murderer but he has become a murderer."

Below are key events in the modern history of Syria and the Assad dynasty:

1916

Diplomats from France and Great Britain draw up an agreement to carve up the Middle East into 'zones of influence' after the expected defeat of Ottoman Turkey in World War I. France will get the northern zone, including what are now Syria and Lebanon, while Britain will oversee the south, including Palestine, Jordan, and the Iraqi oil fields.

1918

The Sykes-Picot agreement, named after the diplomats who drew it up, is put into effect following the end of World War I.

1920

An independent Syria is established by Faisal I of the Hashemite dynasty, who had fought with Lawrence of Arabia against the Turks. His forces are defeated by the French, and French troops occupy Syria later that year.

Photo: Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashemi (centre), later Faisal I of Syria, with delegates including Lawrence of Arabia (in headdress third from right) at Versailles during the 1919 Paris peace conference. (Wikipedia)

1925-27

A rebellion launched by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash is put down by French troops amid heavy fighting in cities including Homs, Hama and Damascus - all flashpoints in the current rebellion.

Photo: Damascus in flames after a French air raid, October 18, 1925 (Wikipedia.fr)

1930

Hafez al-Assad is born into a minority Alawite family in western Syria.

1937

Syria and France negotiate a treaty to give Syria independence, but the government in Paris refuses to ratify it and World War II breaks out in 1939 before any progress can be made.

1940

France falls to Nazi Germany and Syria comes under the control of the puppet Vichy regime. The country is occupied by British, Commonwealth, and Free French forces in 1941.

Photo: Australian soldiers at the Vichy French Aleppo airfield, Syria, in June 1941. (Australian War Memorial/Wikipedia.fr)

1944

Syria is recognised as an independent state and French troops pull out in 1946, ushering in years of coups and political turmoil.

1958-61

Syria and Egypt unite under the banner of the United Arab Republic, with the head of state being Egypt's leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, before Syria secedes following a military coup.

1963

The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party engineers another coup which gives its members a majority in a new cabinet.

1964

Now a high-ranking Ba'ath Party official, Hafez al-Assad becomes a general; in 1965 he will become commander-in-chief of the air force; by 1966, he is minister of defence.

1965

As his father rises through the ranks, Bashar al-Assad is born in Damascus.

Photo: The Assad family in the early 1970s. The young Bashar al-Assad stands in front of his father at far left. (Wikipedia)

1967

Pre-emptive Israeli strikes on Egyptian forces develop into the Six-Day War, with Syria and Jordan joining Egypt in attacks on the Jewish state. Israel prevails, and occupies Syria's Golan Heights along with the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Sinai peninsula.

Photo: Israeli tanks advance towards Syrian positions in the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War (Wikipedia)

1970

Hafez al-Assad seizes power in an internal Ba'ath Party coup. Assad loyalists are installed in key posts throughout the government. His regime builds up Syria's military and develops a cult of personality around the leader while ruthlessly suppressing internal dissent. But overall living standards rise and Syria experiences a relatively long period of stability

1982

Hafez al-Assad sends his troops in to crush a rebellion by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Up to 10,000 people die as troops bombard the city of Hama. During this period Syrian forces also take part in the civil war in neighbouring Lebanon.

Photo: A Syrian soldier and a member of the pro-Syria Amal militia next to a portrait of Hafez al-Assad in west Beirut, 1987.

1994

Bashar al-Assad, studying as an optician in London, is recalled to Syria as heir-apparent after his elder brother dies in a car crash.

Photo: Syrian girls chant slogans praising president Hafez al-Assad after he was elected to his fifth seven-year term in 1999 (Reuters: Khaled Al Hariri)

2000

Hafez al-Assad dies at the age of 69. Bashar al-Assad is elected unopposed as president with a claimed 97 per cent of the vote.

Photo: Bashar al-Assad at his father's funeral in Damascus, June 2000 (AFP: Rabih Moghrabi)

2007

Bashar al-Assad gets another seven-year term as president. During this period he makes cautious overtures to the West, with the so-called Damascus Spring leading to the release of hundreds of political prisoners. But Amnesty International says the Assad regime is still torturing and persecuting political opponents.

2011

Protests inspired by the wider Arab Spring movement break out in Syria in late January. Syrian forces violently put down a number of protest rallies. In June, Assad promises moves towards reform - but the repression continues. By the end of the year, Syria has been suspended by the Arab League and Assad's troops are engaged in a war with rebel forces, led by deserters gathered under the loose banner of the Free Syrian Army.

Photo: Syrian demonstrators protest against Bashar al-Assad on Christmas Day, 2011 (Reuters)

Source: ABC/Wikipedia/AFP/Reuters

Timeline: Syria and the Assads - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

by Ayse Baltacioglu-Brammer

This image depicts Ali, a Jesus-like figure in Alawite theology. Religiously and communally separate from the Muslim populations of Syria, Alawites have ruled for decades through the Assad family. Their unique history sheds light on the civil war raging in Syria today.

 Editor's Note:

The Civil War in Syria has become one of the most bloody and geopolitically important events to come out of the Arab Spring. While the war has become in many ways a sectarian Shi’a-Sunni battle, in Syria there is a third religious group that has played a pivotal role in the history of that country: the Alawites.

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When in early March 2011 the “Arab Spring”—a wave of pro-democracy demonstrations that began in Tunisia in late 2010 and swept across Libya and Egypt—finally reached Syria, people from various religious and ethnic backgrounds (Muslims, non-Muslims, and Alawites; Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen) rallied together to oppose the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the “elected” president of Syria.

The unrest resulted from a combination of socio-economic and political problems that had been building for years and that affect especially Syria’s large rural population. The drought of 2007-2010, high unemployment rates, inflation, income inequality, and declining oil resources all contributed to profound discontent on the part of the opposition movement. Moreover, harsh and arbitrary political repression had also eroded Bashar al-Assad’s long-cultivated facade as a “reformer.”

In the early days of the rebellion, the frequent protest chant, "Syrians are one!" indicated the determination of the demonstrators to show the unity of the opposition movement, which, according to them, was above any sectarian and ethnic division and dispute. In an unusual show of solidarity, in Latakia, the fifth largest city in Syria and one with a major Alawite population, a Sunni Imam led prayers for Alawites, while the Alawite Sheikh led prayers at a Sunni Mosque.

However, two years after the conflict began in the midst of tremendous hope and optimism, it has degenerated into a civil war with more than 100,000 deaths and 2 million refugees. And it has put Syria at the centre of nasty geopolitical struggles involving the United States, Russia, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey.

The war today has in many ways become a war fought between the majority Sunnis, on one side, and Shiites with the support of minority Alawites on the other.

Alawites are adherents of a syncretistic belief with close affinity to Shiite Islam and, importantly, the Assad family is Alawite. But despite their crucial role in the unfolding struggles in Syria, they are little known outside the region.

In most discussions of the Syrian civil war, the most neglected question is: How and why did an opposition movement that initially included various religious and ethnic segments of the Syrian society against a dictatorial regime turn into another sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites?

Answering this question requires us to appreciate the peculiar position occupied by Syrian Alawites and the role played by them in the creation of the modern state of Syria.

We also need to understand how sectarian differences have long been used as a political tool by the Assad family—who have ruled Syria since Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970s—and, before them, by the French who controlled Syria for much of the 20^th century.

Who are the Alawites?

Today Alawites comprise 12-15% of the Syria’s population, or about 2 million people. They mainly live in the mountainous areas of Latakia on the north-western coast, where they constitute almost two-thirds of the population.

The Alawites are composed of several main tribes with numerous sub-tribes. Syria’s Alawites are also divided among two distinct groups: more conservative members of the community, who mainly live in rural regions as peasant farmers and value the traditional aspects and rituals of the belief, and the middle-class, educated, urban Alawites who have been assimilated into Twelver Shi'ism aided by Iranian and Lebanese propaganda. [Twelver Shi'ism is the principal and largest branch of Shiite Islam.]

Syria’s Alawites are a part of the broader Alawite population who live between northern Lebanon and southern-central Turkey. While not doctrinally Shiite, Alawites hold Ali (d. 661), who is considered the first Imam by the Shiites (and the fourth caliph by the Sunnis), in special reverence.

The sect is believed to have been founded by Ibn Nusayr (d. ca. 868), who was allegedly a disciple of the tenth and eleventh Shiite Imams and declared himself the bab (gateway to truth), a key figure in Shiite theology. Alawites were called “Nusayris” until the French, when they seized control of Syria in 1920, imposed the name “Alawite,” meaning the followers of Ali, in order to accentuate the sect's similarities to Shiite Islam.

The origins of the Alawite sect, however, still remain obscure.

While some scholars claim that it began as a Shiite faction, others argue that early Alawites were pagans who adopted themes and motifs first from Christianity and then from Islam. In essence, Alawism is an antinomian religion with limited religious obligations. Despite similarities to the Shiite branch of Islam, some argue that Ibn Nusayr's doctrines made Alawism almost a separate religion.

The Alawites believe in the absolute unity and transcendence of God, who is indefinable and unknowable. God, however, reveals himself periodically to humankind in a Trinitarian form. This, according to the Alawite theology, has happened seven times in history, the last and final being in Ali, Muhammad, and Salman al-Farisi, who was a Persian disciple and close companion of Muhammad.

The Alawites hold Ali to be the (Jesus-like) incarnation of divinity. While mainstream Muslims (both Sunni and Shiite) proclaim their faith with the phrase “There is no deity but God and Muhammad is His prophet,” Alawites assert, “There is no deity but Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman.”

Alawites, furthermore, ignore Islamic sanitary practices, dietary restrictions, and religious rituals. The syncretistic nature of the Alawite belief is further evident in its calendar, which is replete with festivals of Christian, Persian, and Muslim origin.

Giving Ali primacy over the Muhammad, a feature shared by various ghulāt (Shiite extremist) sects, permitting wine drinking, not requiring women to be veiled, holding ceremonies at night, and several pagan practices have led mainstream Muslims to label Alawites to be often singled out as heretics or extremists.

In Syria, ethnically and linguistically Arab, the Alawites developed certain characteristics that isolated them from the Sunni Syrian population.

Alawites before the 20^th Century

Uncertainty about Alawites’ religious identity confused observers and produced suspicion among political and religious authorities that often resulted in persecution over the centuries.

The first proponents of the Alawite faith fled to Syria from Iraq in the 10^th century. In the 11^th century they were forced out of the Levantine cities and into the inhospitable coastal mountains of north-western Syria, which has remained the heartland of the Alawites ever since.

In the 14^th century, Alawite marginalization was perpetuated by the first anti-Alawite fatwa (legal decision) by a Sunni scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), which essentially proclaimed Alawite belief as heresy. Thereafter Alawites suffered major repression by the Mamluks (r. 1250-1517) who ruled the region. Geographically isolated, Alawites maintained their religious integrity in the face of continuous attacks and invasions.

In the Ottoman era (1517-1918), ill treatment continued as Alawites were considered neither Muslim nor dhimmi (a religious group with certain autonomy with regard to communal practices such as Christians and Jews) by the Ottoman government in Istanbul. On the other hand, during much of Ottoman rule, Alawites could practice their religion and a few enjoyed official positions.

The main reason for tension between central Ottoman authority and the Alawite community stemmed from Ottoman efforts to impose its authority by collecting revenue from their local regions. Alawites, who acquired a reputation as “fierce and unruly mountain people,” frequently resisted paying taxes and plundered the Sunni villages.

Attempts by later Ottoman governments to enrol Alawites in the army served as another reason for the Alawite uprisings and perpetuated the strong resentment towards Sunnis, who had so often been seen as their oppressors.

At the end of the 19^th century, Alawites rose up against the Ottoman government demanding more autonomy. The rule of Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1908) did little to diminish these desires, even though he allowed some Alawites to make careers in the Ottoman army and bureaucracy.

The Alawites enjoyed little benefit from the centralized Ottoman government and its largely Sunni-based policies that attempted to convert locals to Sunni Islam through building of mosques in Alawite villages and Sunni training of Alawite children.

The “Turkification” policies pursued by the Young Turks—a group of secularist and nationalist activists who organized a revolution against the Ottoman monarchy in 1908 and ruled the empire until 1918—accelerated the cooperation of the Alawites with new actors in the region: the French.

Alawites during the French Mandate and the Alawite State of 1922

The Alawite region became a part of Syria as a by-product of the notoriously secret 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain. It was placed under the French mandate after the end of World War I.

After defeating and evicting the British-backed Syrian King Faysal in 1920, France, in a divide-and-rule strategy, partitioned Syrian territories into four parts, one of which was Latakia, where most of the population was Alawite.

By promoting separate identities and creating autonomous zones in Syria along the lines of ethnic and sectarian differences, the French mandate aimed to maximize French control and influence in Syria. Muslim and Christian minorities were the main allies of the French against the Arab nationalism rooted among the urban Sunni elite.

Furthermore, Alawite territory was geographically crucial because French forces could use it to control the whole Levant coast.

During the mandate era, many local leaders supported the creation of a separate Alawite nation. Alawite cooperation with French authorities culminated on July 1, 1922 when Alawite territory became an independent state. The new state had low taxation and a sizeable French subsidy.

This independence did not last long. Although Latakia lost its autonomous status in December 1936, the province continued to benefit from a “special administrative and financial regime.”

In return, Alawites helped maintain French rule in the region. For instance, they provided a disproportionate number of soldiers to the French mandate government, forming about half of the troupes spéciales du Levant.

Alawite peasants, who were not only religiously repressed and socially isolated by mainstream Sunni Muslims but also economically exploited by their fellow Alawite landowners, rushed to enlist their sons for the mandate army. As a result, a large number of Alawites from mountain and rural areas became officers and they formed the backbone of the political apparatus that would emerge in the 1960s.

French policy ultimately served its purpose to increase the sense of separateness between the political centre and the autonomous states in Syria's outlying areas.

In Paris in 1936, when France entered into negotiations with Syrian nationalists about Syrian independence, some Alawites sent memoranda written by community leaders emphasizing “the profoundness of the abyss” between Alawites and Sunni Syrians. Alawite leaders, such as Sulayman Ali al-Assad, the grandfather of Hafez al-Assad, rejected any type of attachment to an independent Syria and wished to stay autonomous under French protection.

Yet the Alawite community remained divided over the future of the community. Despite a deep sense of religious difference, an increasing number of Alawites and Sunni Arabs were coming to believe that the inclusion of Alawites in a unified Syria was inevitable. People both within and without Syria worked toward a rapprochement between the predominant Muslims and minority Alawites.

For instance, Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was the Sunni Muslim cleric in charge of Jerusalem's Islamic holy places from 1921 to 1938 and known as a leading Arab nationalist, issued a fatwa declaring Syrian Alawites to be known as Muslim. With this fatwa, al-Husseini aimed to unite the Syrian people against the Western occupation.

Following in his footsteps, several Alawite sheikhs made further statements emphasizing their adherence to the Muslim community (albeit Shiite) and to Arab nationalism. Also, a group of Alawite students were sent to the Najaf province of Iraq to be trained on the Shiite doctrines of Islam.

For all the benefits of French rule for the Alawites, the French Mandate ultimately did little to improve the economic conditions of the Alawite population as a whole. Newly-emerged ideologist parties such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) utilized this fact to turn Alawites against the French and toward Arab nationalism.

Alawites after World War II

It was during the Second World War that the future of the Syrian state and its constituent parts were shaped. When war broke out in 1939, a new generation of Alawites proved more flexible in cooperating with Syrian nationalists, most of whom were Sunni urban elites.

With the formation of Vichy France in mid-1940, ultimate power and authority in Syria rested with the British, who favoured the creation of a unified independent Syria under the leadership of urban Sunni elite. Even though the Alawite territories belonged to independent Syria, historical mistrust between the Alawites and Sunnis made the transformation a lengthy and painful process.

After the war, Syria obtained independence in 1946, but entered into a period of political instability, unrest, and experimentation with pan-Arab connections to Egypt.

Once they recognized that their future lay within independent Syria, Alawites started to play an active role in two key institutions: the armed forces and political parties.

The Ba'ath party, founded in 1947 by several Muslim and Christian Arab politicians and intellectuals to integrate the ideologies of Arab nationalism, socialism, secularism, and anti-imperialism, was more attractive to Alawites than the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni conservative religious organization headquartered in Egypt with a large urban Sunni base in Syria.

Alawites and other minorities continued to be over-represented in the army due to two main factors. Middle-class Sunni families tended to despise the army as a profession, which, according to them, was the place for “the lazy, the rebellious, and the academically backward.” Alawites, on the other hand, saw the military as the main opportunity for a better life.

Second, many Alawites, who had been coping with dire economic circumstances, could not afford to pay the fee to exempt their children from military service.

The Alawite presence in the military culminated in a set of coups in the 1960s. The final coup was carried out by General Hafez al-Assad, himself an Alawite, and brought the Alawite minority to power in Syria in November 1970. In February 1971, Hafez al-Assad became the first Alawite President of Syria.

Alawites and the Assad Dynasty

Born to a relatively well-off Alawite family in a remote village located in north-western Syria, Hafez al-Assad joined the Ba'ath Party in 1946 and rose to the rank of de facto commander of the Syrian army by 1969. Sectarian solidarity has been a crucial component of Assad family rule from the beginning. He relied on the Alawite community to consolidate his power and to establish his dynasty.

In the early stages of his rule, Hafez al-Assad emphasized Syria's pan-Arab orientation that required him to embrace the majority Sunni population. In 1971, he reinstated the old presidential Islamic oath, lifted restrictions on Muslim institutions, and encouraged the construction of new mosques.

At the same time, however, Assad not only placed trusted Alawites in key positions of the regime's security apparatus, but he also improved their living conditions, long among the most degraded in the Arab world. While rural Alawites benefitted from infrastructure improvements such as electricity, water, new roads, and agricultural subsidies, a group of urban Alawites enjoyed employment opportunities in the army and the state bureaucracy.

Overall, Alawites felt a sense of pride that "one of their own" had raised himself to such a high position.

In the end, Assad was unable to win the allegiance of large sections of Sunni Muslim urban society, particularly the conservatives with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. His failure to fully bridge the divide was not only related to the heterodox character of his faith and certain anti-Islamic policies he adopted, but also to policies that favoured his co-sectarians over the rest of the Syrian population.

The clashes between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the president, who symbolized the Alawite minority, culminated in rebellions against the regime in late 1970s and early 1980s.

Simultaneously, language used by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters only served to magnify Alawite insecurity, lead Alawites to back the Assad regime, and exacerbate ongoing tension. For them, Alawites were kuffars (disbelievers).

The peak of this struggle was the battle in Hama in early February 1982, where Alawite (but also some Kurdish) troops killed around 30,000 Sunni civilians, effectively tying the fate of the Alawites to the Assad regime.

From that moment, politics in Syria have been dominated by sectarian divisions.

Sectarian insecurity among the Alawites—who believed that the fall of the regime could lead to revenge against their community following the events in Hama—led to a firm support for hereditary succession in Syrian government. An Alawite attendant at Hafiz al-Assad's funeral in 2000, therefore, did not hesitate to utter, “for us the most important [thing] is that the president should come from the Assad family.”

The Rule of Bashar al-Assad

Even though Bashar al-Assad’s inaugural slogan, “change through continuity,” was reassuring for Alawites, the same slogan was interpreted by the Sunni Syrian majority as an invitation to push for political change.

Bashar al-Assad's initial policies conveyed a message of economic and political reform, but his main strategy was redistributing the spoils of power among the loyal supporters of the regime and his family. These actions, rightfully called the "corporatization of corruption" by former Syrian vice president Abd al-Halim Khaddam, worked against not only the Sunni majority, but also many Alawites, who were left out of the small inner core that includes Bashar al-Assad, his brother, sister, brother-in-law, and cousins.

While the regime and its clients enjoyed unchecked power and wealth at the expense of the majority of Syrians, several instances of sectarian violence between Alawites and Sunnis erupted in Syria. The most recent of these outbreaks occurred in the summer of 2008. Bashar al-Assad used this violence as evidence to argue to Alawites that his authoritarian regime was the only protection for them from what he called Sunni fundamentalism and intolerance.

Moderate Alawites have challenged Assad’s fear-based justifications for his rule and many more liberal Alawites later joined the early protests against the Assad regime. They were much more concerned with Assad’s political oppression, corruption, nepotism, and economic troubles than with sectarian bonds.

The prospect of shattering the historical alliance between the Assad regime and Syria’s Alawites was a tantalizing opportunity for Sunni oppositional leaders.

With this goal in mind, former Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Bayanouni reached out to the Alawites in 2006, stating: “The Alawites in Syria are part of the Syrian people and comprise many national factions … [The] present regime has tried to hide behind this community and mobilize it against Syrian society. But I believe that many Alawite elements oppose the regime, and there are Alawites who are being repressed. Therefore, I believe that all national forces and all components of the Syrian society, including the sons of the Alawite community, must participate in any future change operation in Syria.”

This statement differed dramatically from the antagonistic tone of previous Muslim Brotherhood statements about the heretical nature of the Alawite sect.

Bashar al-Assad, as a keen politician and skilled strategist, would not allow any type of rapprochement between his co-sectarians and the Sunni majority, which has been against the Assad regime for decades.

Beginning early in his reign, Bashar al-Assad not only began actively to emphasize his Alawite roots but also manipulated to his benefit an increasing trend among the Alawites of Syria: conversion to mainstream Shiite Islam. He followed policies of forging ties both with Alawites and Shiites in Syria as a conscious effort to transform the nature of the opposition, from a united front against his anti-democratic rule to sectarian conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites.

From Arab Spring to Civil War

The events of the Arab Spring destabilized Bashar al-Assad’s complicated efforts to balance and contain the forces opposed to his regime and emboldened these diverse challengers to stand together against him.

After protests began in Syria in January 2011, he quickly came to realize that the opposition movement was too powerful to control by turning yet again to the entrenched dependency between the Assad family and the Alawite minority.

As the regime used ever-increasing violence as its only recourse to suppress the opposition, Bashar al-Assad began to develop a new state policy to attract foreign support (especially from Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon) to secure his regime not just as another authoritarian government whose popularity was in decline, but rather as a Shiite state entrenched in the region against neighbouring Sunni states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey.

Al-Assad began to position himself as a pious Shiite through public events, appearances, and organizations. And the main Shiite political and military organizations in the region, Hezbollah and Iran, decided to back up the Assad regime in very concrete ways. They sent much needed financial and military support and ideologically bolstered Bashar al-Assad's fight against the Sunni “terrorists.”

The past eighteen months have proved that Bashar al-Assad’s strategy is serving its purpose as the nature of the conflict has transitioned into sectarian violence between Iran- and Hezbollah-backed Shiites and Sunnis, some of whom are backed by al-Qaida.

As has occurred repeatedly in its history, religious affiliations matter more than any other allegiance in the Syrian political arena and, after an initial burst of opposition to the Assad government, Syria’s Alawites have remained generally supportive (if wary) of his regime.

Despite a general feeling emerging in many Alawite villages that the Assad regime no longer represents them—particularly after affiliating itself with orthodox Shiite actors of the region, who have been known for their hostility against heterodox branches of Shiite Islam, including the Alawites—there is still a great deal of political power to gain for Bashar al-Assad from exploiting the deep-seated Alawite insecurity against the Sunni majority.

The Assad regime has already proved its willingness to drag Alawites, the Syrian state, and even the region, down with it into a violent sectarian chaos if it continues to be challenged.

Nevertheless, there remains an opportunity—perhaps now only a hope—for Alawites and Sunnis to break free from this political deadlock and form a supra-sectarian opposition that triggered the movement two years ago.

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Suggested Reading

Douwes, Dick, The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression, London, 1997.

Faksh, Mahmud A. “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 133-153.

Fildis, Ayse Tekdal. “Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria.”Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012.

Filiu, Jean-Pierre, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising, New York, 2011.

Gelvin, James L., Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998.

_______., The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York, 2012.

Hathaway, Jane (with contributions by Karl K. Barbir). The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800. Harlow: Pearson, 2008.

Heydemann, Steven, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970, Ithaca, 1999.

Khoury, Philip S., Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945, Princeton, 1987.

Lust-Okar, Ellen, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions, New York, 2005.

Lesch, David, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria, New Haven, 2005.

Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime, New Haven, 1991.

Owen, Roger, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, New York, 1992.

Perthes, Volker, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, London, 1995.

Pipes, Daniel. “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 429-450.

Provence, Michael, The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism, Austin, 2005.

Roberts, David, The Baath and the Creation of Syria, New York, 1987.

Seale, Patrick, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989.

Sindawi, Khalid. “The Shiite Turn in Syria.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 8, pp. 82-107.

van Dam, Nikolaos, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba’th Party, New York, 1996.

Wedeen, Lisa, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, Chicago, 1999.

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Source URL: http://origins.osu.edu/article/alawites-and-fate-syria

Alawites and the Fate of Syria

Hassan Ibrahim Last Modified: 29 Feb 2008

A young military officer puts his visions for Arab social justice to the test.

Gamal Abdel Nasser receives a hero's welcome in Port Said in the Suez.

Gamal Abdel Nasser was not just a president of a country, but also the most charismatic leader and visionary the Middle East had seen for many centuries.

His strength of character was evident in his rhetoric, which mobilised Arabs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf, but it also surfaced in the bold socio-economic programmes he introduced to Egypt and the region.

Many people in the Middle East believed Nasser when he boisterously declared victory and did not abandon him even when he admitted defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

His funeral was the largest spectacle of mass grief ever witnessed in the region.

But why would the masses believe and support a leader who had not only been vanquished by the Israelis but also lost most of the Sinai, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights?

The simplest answer is that Nasser was the torch bearer who energised Egyptian and Arab politics, becoming a leading figure in the region.

Social justice

Many Arabs did not abandon Nasser even when he admitted defeat in the 1967 war

It was his firm belief in social justice that pushed him to try to implement socialist policies shortly after the 1952 revolution. However, these policies were not entirely suited to a society that was predominantly hierarchial, semi-feudalist, and agrarian.

As a result, a stratum of intellectuals and technocrats forced Nasser to adopt a more centralised decision-making process which in turn bred autocracy within the new government.

But contrary to the myth perpetuated by his enemies, Nasser was not the fire-brand revolutionary who "brandished his sword and called for the annihilation of Israel"; rather, he was grounded in a realistic approach to regional geo-politics.

He had the unique ability to balance building Egypt's infrastructure and economy with working for the liberation of Palestine - or at the very least, reaching the best possible peace settlement which ensures the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

Nasser was not a warmonger, having experienced firsthand the damage war can inflict on a civilian population. His experience during the 1948 war and the gruelling siege of the Fallujah pocket in Palestine instilled in him an abhorrence for military solutions.

He instead attempted to solve the problems that plagued post-monarchial Egypt through economic and social reforms.

Land reform

Before the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian economy had been dominated by the private sector - a modern application of the feudalist system in which one per cent of the population owned some 85 per cent of the land.

Nasser recognised that existing land ownership schemes were grossly unfair and were the root causes of economic and social disenfranchisement among the landed peasants.

He understood that if Egypt's revolutionary transformation was to have any chance of succeeding and inspiring regional change, the government would have to reverse the monarchial system of land ownership in which the farmers had been treated like serfs.

At a rally during one of his visits to a factory in Cairo, Nasser lamented the plight of the country's peasants and expressed his disappointment that there were some who objected to his land reform projects.

"Why can't they believe that the poor people of Egypt have the right to a decent life on this earth before they die?" he asked.

A standing ovation helped Nasser formulate the "nationalisation and confiscation of properties and businesses" economic plan he would later put into action.

State priorities

Nasser was very measured in his reforms. He did not confiscate all private properties in the manner of his contemporary Josef Stalin, the Soviet premier.

In maintaining the rights of the Egyptian peasantry, he established a ceiling of 200 feddans (roughly 200 acres) for private land ownership, thus ensuring that the class system was not shaken to the roots.

By introducing agrarian reforms, redistributing land and developing the economy along socialist lines in the late 1950s, Nasser revolutionised Egyptian society transforming the very mechanisms at its heart.

Following the 1952 and 1961 land reform initiatives, most of the country's industrial, financial and commercial undertakings were nationalised by the government, including management of the agricultural sector.

Both industrial and agricultural output, along with foreign investment grew considerably after the revolution. The construction of a giant steel mill in Helwan, along with building the Aswan Dam, were perceived as an enormous added value to the Egyptian economy.

One of his most memorable economic and strategic decisions was to re-nationalise the Suez canal, which had been under British-French control for decades - a move that would incur the wrath of many powers in the region.

Nasser's drastic reforms catapaulted Egyptian industry forward and into the modern age. Productivity surged becoming the highest - and the standard - in the Arab World.

Foreign intervention

As the Egyptian masses embraced Nasser and his reforms, many in the Arab world watched with envy – and in some cases, with poisonous jealousy.

Some Arab leaders did not appreciate the revolutionary changes Nasser was introducing to Egypt. When he decided to build the High Dam in Aswan, there was little regional or international financial support.

John Foster Dulles, the US secretary of defense during the Eisenhower administration, vowed that Nasser would never achieve his goals. He urged Arab governments not to deal with Nasser and to actively seek his demise.

Some historians attribute the bloody Yemen conflict - which depleted the power of the Egyptian army - to US prodding of Saudi Arabia to defeat and weaken Nasser.

Grounded

 

Nasser's ideals for a united Arab world still resonate in the region today

Despite his fervour, Nasser never allowed his dreams to cloud his sense of reality.

In 1958, Syrian military and civilian leaders sought to unite their country with Egypt. Though Nasser was surprised by the sudden request and uncertain whether the time was ripe, he agreed.

The merger into the United Arab Republic (UAR) was viewed by many as the first step toward the founding of a Pan-Arab state, but it quickly succumbed to internal rivalries.

However, when a coup in Damascus ended the unity between Egypt and Syria, Nasser refused to use force to crush the separatist dissent.

That was the same wisdom and foresight he used to prevent Iraq's first attempt at occupying Kuwait in 1959. The Egyptian army did not have to fire a single bullet. 

Compare that to the mess of 1991.

It was Nasser's belief that the battle for liberation must be waged everywhere in the region and he consequently supported such movements in Algeria, Yemen and even the Congo.

Revolutionaries like Ahmed Bin Bella, Loran Kabila and even the father of all revolutionaries, Che Guevara, visited Nasser and considered him an inspiration.

Despite the debacle of the UAR and the humiliating defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, Nasser did not lose sight of his Arabist mission.

He purged the army of the destructive elements that led to the crushing defeat and planned diligently to foment Arab unity and military strength to retake lands lost in 1967.

On September 28, 1970, Nasser passed away after trying to mediate between disputing Arab leaders but his legacy and ideals of a united Arab nation live on.

Source: Al Jazeera

Opinion: Nasser, the torch bearer - Arab Unity - Al Jazeera English

Last Modified: 20 Jun 2008

In 1952, an Egyptian army officer stepped forward to lead the drive for Arab unity.

Between 1952 and 1970 there was one man at the heart of the drive for Arab unity

The years between 1952 and 1970 saw the drive for Arab unity at its strongest. It was an age of solidarity and the pursuit of unity through mass political movements. And it was an era dominated by a leader the likes of whom the Arabs had not seen in a long time.

Cairo, the capital of Egypt, is the Arab World's largest city. Home to over 18 million people, it is often called the heart of the Arab World.

It is also considered by many to be the cradle of modern Arab nationalism for it was in Cairo that the idea of a unified Arab nation found its greatest expression.

Bloodless coup

At the end of World War Two, colonialism still dominated large parts of the Arab World. Egypt was a monarchy under British rule and the base of Britain's presence in the Middle East.

Egyptian discontent at still being a colony was rising and Egyptians felt angry and humiliated after their poorly-armed military lost the 1948 war against Israel.
On July 23, 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers, calling themselves the Free Officers Movement, took power in a bloodless coup.

At the forefront of the uprising was a charismatic young army officer called Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
This was the first military coup to happen in the Arab World and it set a precedent for many to follow.

After assuming power, Nasser and the Free Officers formed the Revolutionary Command Council, which constituted the real power in Egypt. General Muhammad Naguib became Egypt's first president.

However, it soon became clear that the revolution was driven by the charisma of Nasser, and his strong ideological notions. Conflict with Naguib over strategies soon resulted in his removal, and in October, 1954 Nasser was appointed president of Egypt. He was the first native Egyptian to rule Egypt in over 2500 years.
Dia' El Din Mohammad Daoud, the secretary-general of the Nasserite movement, says: "Nasser was an ordinary man of the people, not a man of the upper classes, he came from the working classes, the father was a simple employee, his allegiance was always to the people, that's where he came from, that was his image."

Vision

Nasser set about changing Egypt. He had his own vision for both a new nation and the Arab World. Politically, he transformed Egypt into a republic, introducing centralised parliamentary rule, but he is better known for his domestic social programmes.

Nasser and Naguib became bitter enemies after the coup

Nasser's aim was to improve the conditions of the peasant majority - establishing land reforms, free educational programmes for boys and girls and developing the country's medical infrastructure.

Egypt was captivated, and the Arab World watched closely as Nasser expanded on his brand of socialism. He believed that if the people had real equality they would feel more united and act as one entity.
Saadedine Ibrahim, an Egyptian political activist, says: "One of the very early phrases that Nasser coined was addressing the common man: 'Raise your head fellow brother, the end of colonialism has come.' And that is the kind of language, message that echoed very deeply with the average man, because it was a simple language and people who were downtrodden, people who were beaten, mistreated, felt worthless, began to gain that kind of confidence, spirit that they didn't have before."
Never before had an Arab leader achieved such popularity outside his own capital.

Rarely had the population of an underdeveloped Arab World felt that they could participate in the future of their own nations.

Winning Arab hearts

Daoud says: "For the first time an Egyptian leader from the people and not from the upper classes, was able to win the hearts of the Arab people, there was now contact with various Arab forces and dialogue, there was a common language, one with which all Arabs could identify, this paved the way for a common Arab strategy."
Nasser's modern take on nationalism inspired Arabs, in a way which the Nahda, the Arab renaissance of the 19th century, had not. 

Nasserism had taken Arabism a step further. He believed Arabs would be stronger if united, that they shared a common struggle against colonial powers and that the liberation of Palestine should be an Arab duty.
Nasser's vision extended far beyond Egypt. He believed that the lessons of the revolution should be applied in other Arab countries.

His charisma and influence were so great that he inspired Arabs elsewhere to dream of a unified Arab nation. His defiant attitude towards Egypt's former colonial masters made him even more popular. Nasserism swept the region.

Suez Canal crisis

One of Nasser's main concerns was foreign occupation of Arab lands and it was events surrounding this issue which lead to a dramatic turn towards Arab unity.

As early as 1954, he supported Algeria's struggle for independence from the French, by providing arms and military training to Algeria's independence movement. But liberating his own nation from occupation proved to be one of the milestones of his career.
The British, who had originally agreed to remove their troops from the Suez Canal by 1954, still occupied it.

At the same time Egypt desperately needed electricity and the Americans had promised Nasser over $200m to build a hydroelectric power station in Aswan - known as the High Dam. But the US was a strong ally of Israel who - by 1954 - occupied large parts of Palestine.

Nasser's opposition to Israel and what he saw as US and European colonialism as well as his growing relationship with the communist block angered Western powers. The US refused to finance the dam.
In response Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 and turned to the Soviets for financial aid.

The British and French no longer controlled this vital seaway. The old colonial powers were humiliated.
Ibrahim says: "It was fantastic, we went down to the streets, it was late at night, it was summer... streets were full of demonstrations, joy, people cheering... it was like a festival, it was like a feast, a moment of victory again."
What followed was military conflict between Egypt and a coalition of French, British and Israeli forces.

The operation to take the canal was a military success but a political disaster for the coalition - the US fearing Soviet intervention imposed an end to the crisis but allowed Israel to occupy the Sinai.

Arab hero

Despite the military defeat, Nasser had forced the West into submission. The Arab World had a new hero.

The Arab World now felt it could rally behind a strong leader. The effects of his revolution in Egypt soon spread to other Arab nations.
In 1958, the Iraqi Free Officers' Movement, modelled around Nasser's revolution, toppled the monarchy.

In Lebanon, events in 1958 led to a minor civil war between the existing regime and more revolutionary currents, influenced by Nasser's ideas. The US was asked to intervene. US forces landed on Beirut's shores in support of the local government but in the end it was Nasser who brokered a political agreement among the warring factions.

But the most notable spread of Nasserism in 1958 came in Syria.

A power struggle erupted within the military between Baathist and Nasserist currents. Fearing their country might be divided and that this could derail the drive towards Arab unity, a group of Syrian army officers asked Nasser to join Egypt with Syria.

Nasser was reluctant as the two countries had different political systems and experiences; he preferred a federation of two states. But with increasing pressure to find a rapid solution to Syria's situation, Nasser finally agreed, stressing that the two nations would be ruled on his terms.
The United Arab Republic (UAR) was born.

Problems persist

Nasser was a charismatic leader who came from humble beginnings

At the peak of his rule in the late 1950s, Nasser was the most important leader in the Arab World. He had succeeded in uniting at least one Arab nation with another, and ruled over both.

He had outmanoeuvred the old colonial powers and hastened their decline, restoring to the Arabs long lost feelings of pride, self confidence and above all, he managed to set the stage for the creation of an aspirational dream - a unified Arab World.

The dream of Arab unity had taken a huge leap.

 

But there were problems in the new Middle East. Jewish peoples had either been forced or persuaded to leave their ancestral homes in Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Morocco and Syria and emigrate to Israel.

The newly formed UAR was begin to tear apart under the dissent borne of suspicions and rivalries between the Egyptians and Syrians.

The Arab World had a hero, but it had still not been able to win back Palestine. And while Nasser had won many political battles, he had yet to score a battlefield victory against the Israelis who had delivered a punishing defeat to the Arabs in 1948.

Nearly 20 years later, the Arabs new-found sense of pride would come face to face with the harsh realities of yet another defeat.

Source: Al Jazeera

Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution - Arab Unity - Al Jazeera English

Last Modified: 29 Mar 2008

In the 1970s, the Arabs and Israelis fought wars but Egypt soon sued for peace.

 

The struggle to keep Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, an inseparable part of the greater Arab Nation is one of the main issues at the heart of the Question of Arab Unity.

The two states - Arab and Jewish - as envisioned in the 1947 UN partition plan never came into fruition as Arabs and Israelis fought wars, gained and lost land and further plunged the region into conflict.

Over half of the Palestinian population fled the violence or were expelled by Jewish settlers. Almost two decades after the war of 1948, the Palestinians found themselves still living in camps. New solutions were needed, and the Palestinians began to think about pro-actively tackling their problems. Could Arab Unity be forged through war against a common enemy?

As the Palestinian Right of Return became an integral rallying call at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the defeated powers of Egypt and Syria began to plan a military strategy to retake territory lost in the 1967 war.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president who was humiliated in June 1967, began a campaign to re-equip, retrain, and revitalise the Egyptian Army in hopes of eventually recpaturing the Sinai peninsula.

Syria also began to retrain its military forces with an eye on securing the lost Golan Heights.

On October 6, 1973, as Jews celebrated Yom Kippur, Arab forces - mostly comprising of Egyptian and Syrian troops - launched a surprise attack against Israeli forces.

Crossing the Suez, the Egyptians breached the Bar-Lev defence perimeter, which Israeli tacticians had believed to be impregnable.

Initially, the Arabs made remarkable gains on the battlefield.

The Iraqi contingent - which consisted of 30,000 troops and 550 tanks - that was sent to assist the Syrians caught the Israelis completely by surprise, pushing back their counterattack forces.

But within one week, Israel turned the tide, forcing Egypt and Syria to the verge of another massive defeat.

International pressures and Cold War diplomacy between the US and the Soviet Union brought the war to an end on October 26.

Though Egypt, Syria and Iraq suffered losses at the end of the war, the initial gains proved that the Arabs could win major battlefield engagements.

These 'victories' provided the Arabs with psychological momentum, overturning the humiliations stemming from the 1967 defeat, and paving the way for diplomacy.

Camp David

On November 19, 1977, Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian president, became the first leader to visit Tel Aviv and address the Israeli Knesset.

He called for a full implementation of UN resolutions 242 and 338, which were considered the cornerstones of any Arab-Israeli peace treaty.

By the time Egypt and Israel formally signed a peace treaty and opened diplomatic relations at Camp David in 1978, the Arab World had become fragmented.

Suspicions that Sadat had betrayed the Egyptians during the 1973 War came to the forefront as Damascus and Baghdad accused Cairo of prioritizing its own interests while abandoning the rest of the Arab World.

In 1979, the Arab League expelled Egypt. In 1982, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon as Iraq and Iran were engaged in a bloody border war.

In 1989, the Arab League reinstated Egypt in the hopes of unifying the Arab World.

But a year later, another conflict, this time between two sovereign Arab states, would further split the Arab World.

Source: Al Jazeera

Peace after the Yom Kippur War? - Arab Unity - Al Jazeera English

Hussein Elrazzaz Last Modified: 07 Oct 2013

Forty years on, we explore the story of what Egyptians call the October War and Israelis the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

An Israeli armoured column on its way into Syria during the October War between Israel and Egypt and Syria [Getty Images]

Shortly after midnight on October 5, 1973, the telephone rang in the London home of Dubi Asherov, an Israeli case officer handling an Egyptian spy referred to as ‘The Source’. It was ‘The Source’ and his message was simple: “I need to meet the boss, urgently.”
Asherov called Tel Aviv to wake his superior, Zvi Zamir, the director of Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad. Within just a few hours, Zamir was on his way to the British capital, where he met ‘The Source’ in a Mossad safe house. The information he heard there was astonishing – but what made it all the more important was the identity of the man delivering it.
“Ashraf Marwan was one of the best spies in espionage history,” explains Ahron Bregman from the department of war studies at King’s College, London. “He was the perfect spy. He was not only clever and very, very efficient but he was also very close to the information. He was a relative of [Gamal Abdul] Nasser [the Egyptian president from 1956 until 1970] and he was the right hand man of President [Anwar] Sadat [who ruled Egypt from 1970 until 1981].”
So, when Marwan told Zamir that the following day at 6pm Egypt and Syria would launch an attack on Israel, there was every reason to believe him. But was this a genuine leak from the very centre of Egyptian power or was ‘The Source’ delivering information that was designed to deceive?  

All-out war

On the morning of October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the Israeli cabinet met in an emergency session. It decided on the immediate mobilisation of reservists and devised a defence plan, codenamed ‘Dovecote’, which would be triggered two hours before the start of the battle.
At 2pm, 6,220 Egyptian air force jets crossed the Suez Canal, heading for Sinai, while Syrian jets simultaneously began a massive aerial strike on Israeli positions in the Golan Heights.

The two countries had launched an all-out war against Israel – and they had done it four hours earlier than ‘The Source’ had led the Israelis to believe they would. Their aim: to liberate the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights - territories occupied by Israel six years earlier during the Six Day War.  
Despite earlier intelligence warnings of an upcoming Arab attack, the head of Aman, Israel’s military intelligence, General Eli Zeira, was convinced there was nothing to worry about. As a result, Israel was completely unprepared. Its regular army was outnumbered and its reservists were not yet in place.
While Sadat’s close relationship with the Soviets guaranteed a supply of military hardware, the Israelis knew that he had been unable to obtain the latest generation of attack weapons and that without them their military might outweighed that of Egypt.
But, ever since the humiliation of the Six Day War, Egyptians had longed to see their country fight back. “There was a devastating feeling of crisis and defeat then,” explains Egyptian author and journalist Gamal El-Ghitani.
And while the Egyptian people agitated for war, the most powerful constituency of all, Egypt’s army, was also desperate to show that it could take on – and defeat – the enemy it faced across the Suez Canal every day.

A point to prove

Aware that his country’s weapons were dated and that it lacked the ability to liberate the Sinai in its entirety in a military operation, just four months after taking power, Sadat had offered the Israelis a peace deal if they would withdraw from Sinai. Golda Meir, the then Israeli prime minister, rebuffed the offer.
So, left to contemplate a war, Sadat found an ally. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had come to power through a coup d’etat in 1970, and he too had a point to prove to his people.
Hisham Jaber, the director of the Middle East Studies Centre in Beirut, explains: “Hafez al-Assad was the defence minister during the 1967 defeat, and was held mainly accountable …. So, since al-Assad came to power in Syria, he started to absolve himself of the 1967 defeat, and to prepare the Syrian army for the next battle.”
In a series of meetings throughout 1973, Sadat and Assad refined their war plan, giving it the codename ‘Badr’ after the Prophet Mohammed’s first victorious battle.

Crossing the Suez Canal

Syria began concentrating its troops in the Golan, while Egypt did the same on the Suez Canal. But, having responded to a similar build-up five months earlier only to find that the Egyptians had gone no further than the edge of the Canal, Israeli military intelligence was determined not to make the same costly mistake.
“In a document that Aman published at noon … [on] October 5, it was a perfect description of the Egyptian army [getting] ready to go to war,” says Israeli military historian Uri Bar-Joseph. “The bottom line was we nevertheless believed that there was no change in the Egyptian estimate regarding the balance of forces with the IDF, and therefore the likelihood for war is low.”
Within minutes of the first aerial attacks, a massive artillery barrage began. Under the cover of artillery fire, the first wave of Egyptian ground troops crossed the Canal – 4,000 men in 720 rafts. With the war already half an hour old, ‘Dovecote’ was rushed into action. But, by 5pm, 45 Egyptian infantry battalions had crossed the Canal. ‘Dovecote’ had failed.
By sunrise on day two, the war appeared to have been an unequivocal success for Egypt’s armed forces; 100,000 men, more than 1,000 tanks and over 10,000 other vehicles had crossed the Suez Canal with only minimal losses.

An advantage lost

On the Golan front, three Syrian infantry divisions crossed the 1967 ceasefire line known as the Purple Line. And, two hours into the war, the Syrians gained their first significant victory when they captured ‘Israel’s Eye’ – a key Israeli vantage point 2,000m above sea level on top of Mount Hermon.

On the defensive

In Sinai, however, the Egyptians had used their success on day one to secure defensive bridgeheads, and were subsequently prepared for the inevitable Israeli counterattack when it began on October 8.
Yosri Omara from the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division recalls: “We received orders to fire. We fired at them with every weapon we had …. It was a massacre … in the true meaning of the word …. The Egyptian RPG soldiers were moving like birds, like birds jumping from one tree to another. They would hide behind a ramp till the tank was 50m away and within range, then they fired at it. They would knock that one out then move on to the next tank.”
For the first time in its 25-year history, Israel was on the defensive. And, as the first week of the conflict concluded, it suffered another serious blow. On October 13, in front of the world’s media, the last of Israel’s Bar-Lev line of fortresses along the eastern coast of the Suez Canal surrendered to the 43rd battalion of Egyptian commandos.
“I couldn’t believe my eyes, seeing the Israeli soldiers waving the white flag, and humiliated,” says Hamdy El-Shorbagy from the Egyptian 43rd Commando Battalion.
The streets of Cairo filled with Egyptians reveling in their military’s triumphs and the first liberation of land occupied by Israel in the Six Day War provoked an enthusiastic response across the Arab world.
But in less than 24 hours, Israel had mobilised two armoured divisions, which soon turned the Syrian advance into a retreat. The Israelis advanced, capturing territory deep inside Syria.

Two different wars

Eight months earlier Sadat and Assad had forged the plan to launch a war against Israel on two fronts. But it now seemed that the two presidents had entirely different concepts of the war they had planned together.
“Assad told me that from the moment of his seizure of power, his ambition, his dream, was to avenge the defeat of 1967 when Syria had lost the Golan to Israel and when Assad himself was the defence minister,” says Patrick Seale, a British journalist and Hafez al-Assad biographer. “So I think he felt it as a personal responsibility for the recovery of the land. Assad saw the war, which he was planning, as a war of liberation.”
Sadat, on the other hand, had sought a limited war to focus the minds of the world’s superpowers, and to jump-start the stalled peace process.  
A week into it, Sadat’s personal target had already been surpassed, and a swift victory appeared to be in sight. So when, on October 13, the British ambassador to Egypt delivered an offer to broker a UN ceasefire resolution, which he said the Israelis were prepared to accept based on the current positions, seduced by success, Sadat refused. He would, he stated, only accept a ceasefire if Israel withdrew from the whole of Sinai.
“Things were going very well for Sadat,” explains Abraham Rabinovich, the author of The Yom Kippur War. “He didn’t want to stop the war. Something dramatic had to be done to persuade him to agree to a ceasefire; maybe even to get him to request a ceasefire, and the only thing that could work was [the] crossing of the Canal. That might scare him enough.”
On the morning of October 14, the Egyptian armour moved east. But the Israelis were waiting in pre-prepared positions and, within the first few minutes of battle, the Egyptians suffered significant casualties. By midday, 250 tanks had been lost and the Egyptian general command ordered all advancing forces to retreat.
On the Syrian front, the Israelis had suffered heavy losses, but achieved significant gains - advancing to within 35km of Damascus, and occupying new territories to bring to the bargaining table. They were now able to turn their attention south to the Egyptians. The plan to cross the Suez Canal had been finalised and given the name ‘Stouthearted Men’. But first they would have to take on the southern flank of the Egyptian 2nd army, which stood in the way of an Israeli advance.

The Battle of Chinese Farm

The ensuing fight would centre around an Egyptian agricultural development on which work had begun in the early 1960s with the help of Japanese experts. When they had occupied the area during the Six Day War, the Israelis had mistaken the Japanese writing on irrigation equipment for Chinese. The farm had now been recaptured by the Egyptians but at dusk on October 15, Israeli tanks started their assault on the ‘Chinese Farm’.
By the morning of October 16, 15 rafts had reached the Canal and begun ferrying Israeli tanks to the west. The crossing went almost unnoticed by the Egyptians and, later that same morning, in his first public appearance since the war started, Sadat led a victory parade through the streets of Cairo.
Egyptian reports about the Israeli crossing were confusing and underestimated the scale of the problem. It was only when the Israeli forces in the west went on the offensive that the Egyptians realised their enemy was already in their backyard.
The Egyptians suffered heavy losses. After two days of heavy fighting over the Chinese Farm, the remnants of the brigade that had blocked the road to the Canal retreated - but only after making the Israelis pay a steep price.
“Yes, [it was a] painful victory, very painful, mainly because of the dead and the wounded,” remembers Uri Dan, an Israeli war correspondent. “In one night of the crossing of the Canal, we lost some 400 people. Tanks were fighting, some of them we saw in broad daylight later, one barrel against another, like two sword combatants in medieval time[s]. But, here they were tanks, both of them destroyed, maybe most of the people in … them dead. The valley of death next day, along the Canal was terrible, but we were on the other side of the Canal.”
On October 18, the Israeli high command decided to capitalise on the successful crossing, building their presence on the western bank of the Canal to three armoured divisions. One division would move north to surround the Egyptian 2nd army and capture the city of Ismailia. The other two divisions would move south to encircle the Egyptian 3rd army and capture the city of Suez.
Soon after, Sadat summoned the Soviet ambassador to Egypt and told him that he was ready to accept a ceasefire. This time, however, it was the Israelis who had no interest.
“We can say that Israel had a greater interest in the ceasefire not kicking in right at that moment because it still had work to do – still territory it wants to capture,” explains Rabinovich.

Global implications

Two weeks into the war, and with the opposing forces locked in a stalemate, Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, arrived in Moscow. His goal was to agree a UN ceasefire acceptable to Egypt’s Soviet allies.
On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338, calling for a ceasefire. The fighting was due to stop at 6.52pm Middle Eastern time. But as morning broke on October 23, Israelis forces went into action as normal. By the end of the day they had bypassed Suez City and reached the port of Adabia.
The Egyptian 3rd army, dug in on the eastern side of the Canal, was surrounded by Israeli troops on every side – 35,000 men were cut off from their bases.
On October 23, the Security Council reconvened to confirm the ceasefire - issuing Resolution 339 and directing that UN observers be dispatched to the front. This new ceasefire was scheduled to go into effect at 7am the following day. But, once again, Israel broke it.
“Their main target was a big city, the conquering of a big city, either Ismailia or Suez. A city with a big name,” explains El-Ghitani. “They were fighting more of a media battle, but at the same time, they wanted to achieve a bigger political goal.”

The battle for Suez

Until the Six Day War, Suez was a flourishing industrial city and port. But after 1967, the city found itself on the frontline between Egypt and Israeli-occupied Sinai. A target for Israeli attacks, it was soon reduced to rubble. A quarter of a million people were evacuated leaving the city virtually abandoned. Just 5,000 people remained to manage the infrastructure and man the remaining factories.
Early on October 24, just as the new ceasefire was scheduled to start, Israeli tanks and troops moved into the semi-deserted city. But they soon encountered resistance from a small militia. By the time they were driven from the city, 80 Israeli soldiers were dead and 120 wounded.
On the same day, an alarming message reached Washington: the Soviets were considering taking unilateral action to impose the ceasefire. With Richard Nixon, the US president, submerged in the ‘Watergate Scandal’, it was left to Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, to handle the crisis. He decided to respond to the Soviet threat with a show of force. The US armed forces state of alert was raised to the highest level in peacetime.
Walter J Boyne, the author of The Two O'Clock War says: “The question of the US versus [the] Soviet Union always boils down to mutual annihilation: we could’ve killed everybody in the Soviet Union, they could’ve killed everybody in the US, and the rest of the world would’ve gone. It was an absolutely insane situation. The thing that saved it was that each side knew that if a war occurred the leaders themselves would get killed. So when you know you are going to get killed in a war, not just some poor peasant soldier is going to get killed, you make different decisions about starting a war.”
The next day, diplomacy prevailed, the Soviets stepped back and the alert was defused. But for a full 24 hours, the world had stood on the brink of a war between two nuclear superpowers.
Meanwhile, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 340 – its third in less than four days.

Fighting on alone

As the balance shifted in favour of Israel, other Arab countries sent troops in support of Syria and Egypt. The Syrian front was strengthened by the arrival of expeditionary forces from Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The plan was to use this cocktail of Arab forces to drive the Israelis out of the pocket they had occupied in the Syrian mainland.
The date of the attack was set for October 23. But it would never happen, because Egypt’s Sadat had accepted a UN ceasefire that would take effect that evening.
Al-Assad now faced the prospect of fighting on alone, so the Syrians, too, bowed to the inevitable.
But one major open sore remained for Tel Aviv. The Israeli listening post on top of Mount Hermon had been captured by Syrian paratroopers on the first day of war. With Israel now in the ascendant, on October 23, the Golani Brigade attacked. They suffered heavy losses but secured their prize.

Madina Charter The First Islamic Constitution For All

The earliest recorded constitution, the Charter concerns the rights and responsibilities of the Muslim, Jewish, and other Arab and tribal communities of Medina during the war between that city and its neighbours.

Medina Charter was created by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in the year 622 CE, it was the first written constitution in the Islamic world. The Medina Charter contained every aspect of running a country from politic to the human rights administration. Do the Muslim majority country now really follow what the Prophet had laid down for mankind to follow?
The Medina Charter consists of 47 clauses. 23 clause governed the relationship between Muslims, between Ansar and Muhajirin, while the remaining 24 clauses governed  the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims, the Jews and others. In addition to the charter of Medina, it is also known by various names such as Medina agreement, Dustar al-Madinah and Al-Madinah Sahifah. The Medina Charter form the constitution for Medina which was based from the regulations of Islamic law to establish a pure Islamic state that puts people of different races or ethnic groups in one country living peacefully.
The main contents in the Charter were the declaration that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is the head of state to all the people of Medina and any dispute shall be referred to him. All the people of Medina is forbidden to plant a hostile or envy among themselves, instead they should be united as one and be known as nation of Medina.
All residents are free to practice their customs and religious ceremonies respectively. All residents of Medina should cooperate in economic and if Medina to be attacked by outsiders all the citizen shall defend its. The Jews freedom are guaranteed as long as they obey the agreements listed in the charter.
The purposed of the Medina Charter was to face a plural society of Medina and was to establish rules that will be complied by all the people. The charter also provide elements to unite people of various races and to establish peace and eliminate any hostility that was occurring before the arrival of Prophet Muhammad to Medina.
The Medina Charter also determined the rights and duties of Prophet Muhammad and the local population. It's also provide guidelines for the Muhajirin (immigrants) recovery and providing help either material or non material to them after losing everything for leaving Mecca. Political union was also formed to defend Medina from any foreign enemy. The Charter give a clear guarantee for the right of the non Muslim and the Jews.
Medina Charter was not only the first Islamic constitution but it was also the first human right charter that provided the basic rights of every human living in Medina.
Medina Charter was created based on Holy Koran and Sunnah. Therefore the Holy Koran and Sunnah are the source of state law. The charter also was an instrument to unite the nation and a signed of a state sovereignty. Other principles that contain in the charter were; Freedom of movement and the right to live in Medina, rights and duties in terms of defending and maintaining the State. It also provide good relations and mutual help among all citizens and individual responsibility and government duty in upholding social justice. Some security laws such as penalties and so forth have been listed as Qisas. Religious freedom was also guarantee and the responsibility of states to non-Muslims. It also stated the duty of all parties toward bringing and upholding peace in the State.
It is justified to say the Medina Charter produced a form of government that adheres to the shura system (parliamentary system) where citizen can give opinions. The charter had a great impact toward the development of Islamic civilization, especially in politics and the human rights of the ordinary citizen. The Medina Charter shows that Islam can be practiced in creating an efficient and just government.
However the Muslim majority countries all over the world now are facing with all kind of problems from their own making and its has nothing to do with the western power. The western countries succeed in developing their countries because they are implementing the rules and regulations that are suitable to them. But the Islamic countries either copying from the west and failed because does not conform to the norms of the majority or created a new form of system that only suitable to the iron claws of the power hungry politician. In the end the people suffered and Islam which should be the way of living is only used during birth of a child, marriage and death!
The Muslim leaders does not even respect the human rights that the Prophet had lay down 1400 years ago. The rights of the people either Muslim or non-Muslim has been discriminate for years as if the Medina Charter been kept and locked in the dusty shelves. From Gamal Nasir to Muamar Kahdafi none has ever used or implemented the true Islamic law in administering their countries. An Islamic scholar and politician from Malaysia, who was disappointed with his country freedom of expression restriction once commented, "Sometime the European are more Islamic than the Muslim!". 
It is safe to say that not a single country of the Muslim majority countries or even the terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda are practising the true Islamic governance that the Prophet taught and lived by. Maybe it is time for every leader to start reading the Medina Charter and give the people their rights as what Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) taught

THE MEDINA CHARTER

622 C.E.

1. This is a document from Muhammad the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), governing relations between the Believers i.e. Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who followed them and worked hard with them. They form one nation - Ummah.
2. The Quraysh Mohajireen will continue to pay blood money, according to their present custom.
3. In case of war with any body they will redeem their prisoners with kindness and justice common among Believers. (Not according to pre-Islamic nations where the rich and the poor were treated differently).
4. The Bani Awf will decide the blood money, within themselves, according to their existing custom.
5. In case of war with anybody all parties other than Muslims will redeem their prisoners with kindness and justice according to practice among Believers and not in accordance with pre-Islamic notions.
6. The Bani Saeeda, the Bani Harith, the Bani Jusham and the Bani Najjar will be governed on the lines of the above (principles)
7. The Bani Amr, Bani Awf, Bani Al-Nabeet, and Bani Al-Aws will be governed in the same manner.
8. Believers will not fail to redeem their prisoners they will pay blood money on their behalf. It will be a common responsibility of the Ummat and not of the family of the prisoners to pay blood money.
9. A Believer will not make the freedman of another Believer as his ally against the wishes of the other Believers.
10. The Believers, who fear Allah, will oppose the rebellious elements and those that encourage injustice or sin, or enmity or corruption among Believers.
11. If anyone is guilty of any such act all the Believers will oppose him even if he be the son of any one of them.
12. A Believer will not kill another Believer, for the sake of an un-Believer. (i.e. even though the un-Believer is his close relative).
13. No Believer will help an un-Believer against a Believer.
14. Protection (when given) in the Name of Allah will be common. The weakest among Believers may give protection (In the Name of Allah) and it will be binding on all Believers.
15. Believers are all friends to each other to the exclusion of all others.
16. Those Jews who follow the Believers will be helped and will be treated with equality. (Social, legal and economic equality is promised to all loyal citizens of the State).
17. No Jew will be wronged for being a Jew.
18. The enemies of the Jews who follow us will not be helped.
19. The peace of the Believers (of the State of Madinah) cannot be divided. (it is either peace or war for all. It cannot be that a part of the population is at war with the outsiders and a part is at peace).
20. No separate peace will be made by anyone in Madinah when Believers are fighting in the Path of Allah.
21. Conditions of peace and war and the accompanying ease or hardships must be fair and equitable to all citizens alike.
22. When going out on expeditions a rider must take his fellow member of the Army-share his ride.
23. The Believers must avenge the blood of one another when fighting in the Path of Allah (This clause was to remind those in front of whom there may be less severe fighting that the cause was common to all. This also meant that although each battle appeared a separate entity it was in fact a part of the War, which affected all Muslims equally).
24. The Believers (because they fear Allah) are better in showing steadfastness and as a result receive guidance from Allah in this respect. Others must also aspire to come up to the same standard of steadfastness.
25. No un-Believer will be permitted to take the property of the Quraysh (the enemy) under his protection. Enemy property must be surrendered to the State.
26. No un-Believer will intervene in favour of a Quraysh, (because the Quraysh having declared war are the enemy).
27. If any un-believer kills a Believer, without good cause, he shall be killed in return, unless the next of kin are satisfied (as it creates law and order problems and weakens the defence of the State). All Believers shall be against such a wrong-doer. No Believer will be allowed to shelter such a man.
28. When you differ on anything (regarding this Document) the matter shall be referred to Allah and Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace).
29. The Jews will contribute towards the war when fighting alongside the Believers.
30. The Jews of Bani Awf will be treated as one community with the Believers. The Jews have their religion. This will also apply to their freedmen. The exception will be those who act unjustly and sinfully. By so doing they wrong themselves and their families.
31. The same applies to Jews of Bani Al-Najjar, Bani Al Harith, Bani Saeeda, Bani Jusham, Bani Al Aws, Thaalba, and the Jaffna, (a clan of the Bani Thaalba) and the Bani Al Shutayba.
32. Loyalty gives protection against treachery. (loyal people are protected by their friends against treachery. As long as a person remains loyal to the State he is not likely to succumb to the ideas of being treacherous. He protects himself against weakness).
33. The freedmen of Thaalba will be afforded the same status as Thaalba themselves. This status is for fair dealings and full justice as a right and equal responsibility for military service.
34. Those in alliance with the Jews will be given the same treatment as the Jews.
35. No one (no tribe which is party to the Pact) shall go to war except with the permission of Muhammed (may Allah bless him and grant him peace). If any wrong has been done to any person or party it may be avenged.
36. Any one who kills another without warning (there being no just cause for it) amounts to his slaying himself and his household, unless the killing was done due to a wrong being done to him.
37. The Jews must bear their own expenses (in War) and the Muslims bear their expenses.
38. If anyone attacks anyone who is a party to this Pact the other must come to his help.
39. They (parties to this Pact) must seek mutual advice and consultation.
40. Loyalty gives protection against treachery. Those who avoid mutual consultation do so because of lack of sincerity and loyalty.
41. A man will not be made liable for misdeeds of his ally.
42. Anyone (any individual or party) who is wronged must be helped.
43. The Jews must pay (for war) with the Muslims. (this clause appears to be for occasions when Jews are not taking part in the war. Clause 37 deals with occasions when they are taking part in war).
44. Yathrib will be Sanctuary for the people of this Pact.
45. A stranger (individual) who has been given protection (by anyone party to this Pact) will be treated as his host (who has given him protection) while (he is) doing no harm and is not committing any crime. Those given protection but indulging in anti-state activities will be liable to punishment.
46. A woman will be given protection only with the consent of her family (Guardian). (a good precaution to avoid inter-tribal conflicts).
47. In case of any dispute or controversy, which may result in trouble the matter must be referred to Allah and Muhammed (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), The Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) of Allah will accept anything in this document, which is for (bringing about) piety and goodness.
48. Quraysh and their allies will not be given protection.
49. The parties to this Pact are bound to help each other in the event of an attack on Yathrib.
50. If they (the parties to the Pact other than the Muslims) are called upon to make and maintain peace (within the State) they must do so. If a similar demand (of making and maintaining peace) is made on the Muslims, it must be carried out, except when the Muslims are already engaged in a war in the Path of Allah. (so that no secret ally of the enemy can aid the enemy by calling upon Muslims to end hostilities under this clause).
51. Everyone (individual) will have his share (of treatment) in accordance with what party he belongs to. Individuals must benefit or suffer for the good or bad deed of the group they belong to. Without such a rule party affiliations and discipline cannot be maintained.
52. The Jews of al-Aws, including their freedmen, have the same standing, as other parties to the Pact, as long as they are loyal to the Pact. Loyalty is a protection against treachery.
53. Anyone who acts loyally or otherwise does it for his own good (or loss).
54. Allah approves this Document.
55. This document will not (be employed to) protect one who is unjust or commits a crime (against other parties of the Pact).
56. Whether an individual goes out to fight (in accordance with the terms of this Pact) or remains in his home, he will be safe unless he has committed a crime or is a sinner. (i.e. No one will be punished in his individual capacity for not having gone out to fight in accordance with the terms of this Pact).
57. Allah is the Protector of the good people and those who fear Allah, and Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) is the Messenger of Allah (He guarantees protection for those who are good and fear Allah).

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This text is taken from A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad — A

Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, Oxford University Press,

Karachi, 1955; pp. 231-233. Numbering added.

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